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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(k). Jurisdiction in 
the Utah Supreme Court prior to transfer was proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court properly rule that the accident in question occurred outside 
the scope of employment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's ruling is a conclusion of law reviewed 
de novo by this Court. J.H. by D.H. v. West Vallev City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992). 
2. Did the district court properly rule from the uncontroverted evidence that appellant 
failed to raise a jury question regarding negligent employment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's ruling is a conclusion of law reviewed 
de novo by this Court. J.H. by D.H. v. West Valley City. 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no determinative Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or 
regulations. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This action arose out of a shooting which occurred October 8, 1991. Appellant, Daniel 
Stilinovich, was accidentally shot by a third party, Quade Cowdell, while at Cowdell's place of 
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employment. Stilinovich filed suit against Cowdell's employer, appellee Delle Auto Truck Stop, 
Inc., alleging vicarious liability and negligent employment. (R.3-4). Delle Auto moved for 
summary judgment, and Stilinovich responded. (R. 13-26, 52-70, 73-89). After oral argument, 
the district court granted summary judgment. (R. 107-09). 
Statement of Facts 
Quade Cowdell was initially hired by Delle Auto in June 1991 to dump garbage. (R. 118 
at 5). He learned of the opportunity through an acquaintance who already worked at Delle Auto, 
Ann Martinez, who mentioned Cowdell when Delle Auto Manager Frank Morris asked Marti lez 
if she knew anyone who could "work with other people." (R.118 at 6-7; R.119 at 13-14). 
Over the next few months, Cowdell "got to know" Delle Auto personnel, including 
Morris. (R.118 at 34). He did not have any problems in his employment with Delle Auto. 
(R.118 at 7, 45-46). In August 1991, Delle Auto had an opening for the night clerk position. 
Cowdell submitted an application form which included, among other things, information 
regarding past employment history. (R.119 at 14). 
At the time he was hired as clerk, Cowdell was 16. (R.3). His duties as clerk were 
"[j]ust to work the cash register and just make sure everything is stocked and clean up." (R. 
118 at 5). Cowdell's job responsibilities did not require two persons. (R.118 at 45-46). 
Upon hiring Cowdell for the clerk position, Morris instructed Cowdell not to use force 
to resist a robbery or other crime, but to "just give them the money." (R.118 at 7, 35-36). 
Prior to the accidednt, Cowdell had never seen a gun at the store, and was unaware of any 
person ever having a gun on the premises. (R.118 at 17, 52). 
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The gun Cowdell had on the night of the shooting had been given to him by some friends 
for personal use ~ "going out and shooting guns, shooting .22s and stuff - about two weeks 
earlier. (R.118 at 25). 
When Cowdell and his friends talked about Cowdell getting the gun, Cowdell's 
employment was never mentioned. (R. 118 at 25). Cowdell had completed a gun safety course 
a year or two before the accident. (R. 118 at 43-44). 
At the time the accident occurred, Stilinovich had been living in Cowdell's home for 
several months. (R.118 at 17-18; R.120 at 13). Stilinovich had been around Cowdell with the 
gun, and had handled the gun himself. (R.118 at 44). 
Until the night of the shooting, Cowdell kept the gun under the seat of his truck every 
night. (R.51). Neither Morris nor any of Cowdell's co-workers knew that Cowdell had a 
firearm in his possession at work on the day of the accident, or any other day. (R.118 at 38, 
55). 
On the night in question, Stilinovich accompanied Cowdell to work to keep him 
company. Stilinovich was not an employee or customer of Delle Auto. (R. 118 at 21). Cowdell 
testified that he and Stilinovich became concerned when a "scraggly"-looking customer came into 
the store. Cowdell went out to his truck and brought the gun in to the store, placing it under 
a counter. The customer could not see the gun there, and Cowdell does not know if the 
customer ever saw it. (R.118 at 38-39). About 10 minutes later, the customer left. (R.118 at 
39). 
Cowdell then decided to clean the gun. A few minutes into that task, the gun discharged, 
striking Stilinovich. (R.118 at 40-41). 
3 
Delle Auto does not provide, permit, authorize, or require any employee to carry a 
firearm at work. (R.36-38). In fact, on the one occasion when Morris learned that an employee 
had a firearm at work, he told him "right then and there, put it in your car. I don't want it 
inside the building." (R. 119 at 20). 
Cowdell could not think of any reason Delle Auto would want him to have a gun on the 
premises. (R.118 at 37). He acknowledged that, in fact, Delle Auto did not want him to use 
a gun at work. (R. 118 at 35-37). Stilinovich maintains that "if an employee used a gun to foil 
a robbery that would benefit the defendant Dell Auto Truck Stop, the employer." (Brief of 
Appellant, p. 4). However, that characterization overstates Morris' testimony: 
Q. Number seven [of the affidavit], you say no purpose of 
Delle Auto Truck Stop would be served by him carrying or 
handling a firearm. 
A. No, there wouldn't be. 
Q. Let me, and I know your philosophy is that you'd rather 
have items taken than have him have a firearm, but, and I 
know this didn't happen, but if he prevented a theft or 
damage through the use of a firearm that would serve the 
purpose of the truck stop if it was prevented? I know you 
would rather that he didn't, but nevertheless that's a fact 
that that would serve a purpose? 
A. I don't know how you would look at it like that. If a guy 
came along and stopped a burglar/ in process with a 
firearm, well, yeah, it was useful. 
(R.118 at 21-22). 
Stilinovich states that Morris assumed that "'all young men'" like Mr. Cowdell have a 
firearm. (Brief of Appellant, p. 5). This assertion is somewhat misleading, however. The cited 
portion of Morris' testimony actually states: 
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Q: Now, I've asked you No. 9 [about paragraph No. 9 of Mr. 
Morris' affidavit], which you stated you have no knowledge that 
Mr. Cowdell had a firearm in his possession or at any other time 
while at work. That's No. 9. You've never known him to have 
a firearm at any time? 
MR. HANSEN: You said no knowledge, you're talking about at work? 
That's what it says in No. 9. 
MR. PEATROSS: At work, yes. 
THE WITNESS: No, I had no knowledge that he had one. 
Q: Do you know whether or not he had one in his vehicle which he 
brought to work? 
A: No. / don't recall of even the fact that he had one. I don't know 
if the wan owned one or anything. It's my assumption that people 
living out like that, all young kids or all young men have the 
firearms, but I would be wrong to say that I did know. 
(R.119 at 20-21; emphasis added) 
Stilinovich states that the truck stop cash register had been "robbed before." In fact, the 
only incident which had occurred was when "the guy, operator, went out there to wake up a 
truck driver on his request and left a till open, unlocked, and so he reached in and grabbed some 
cash and that was it." (R.120 at 12). 
Stilinovich also asserts that a few weeks before the incident, a customer had told Cowdell 
that he (the customer) used to kill people for money. For clarification, it should be noted that 
the customer indicated he was in the Mafia. (R.118 at 55). There was no indication that the 
customer was suggesting a propensity to rob truck stops. Finally, Stilinovich states that Cowdell 
started carrying a .22 revolver "because of these incidents." However, Cowdell actually testified 
that he obtained and carried the gun for purely personal reasons: 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
A. 
And that was the purpose that you owned the pistol even, or that 
you had it, was for hunting? 
Yeah, just shooting .22s. 
Shooting rabbits? 
Yeah. 
Or whatever it was out there? 
Yeah. 
So you had the gun for kind of personal purposes? 
Yes. 
You never thought you'd better buy a gun so when I'm working 
I'll have one? 
No. 
(R.118at43). 
Furthermore, Cowdell testified that he took the gun with him everywhere: 
Q. Now, would it be fair to say that this gun that you had to 
protection under the seat of your car, you would have that to 
protection wherever you went? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Not just at work? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So if you were some other place and you felt like there was a 
concern you could always go to your gun and have it available to 
you. 
Yes. 
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Q. And that was a personal decision you made with respect to how to 
live your life, that you might want to have a gun available to help 
you in case you feel its necessary? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It wasn't anything that was dictated by Delle Auto Truck Stop for 
you to have a gun? 
A. No. 
Q. Or by Mr. Morris? 
A. No. 
(R.118 at 62-63). 
When Cowdell had the gun with him at work, it was only for his own personal interests 
and protection: 
Q. Why did you take [the gun] to work? 
A. To my own protection. 
(R.118 at 54). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly ruled that, based upon the uncontroverted evidence, 
Cowdell's act of shooting Stilinovich was not within the scope of his employment. Although 
the accident occurred within authorized time and spacial limits, Cowdell's conduct before and 
at the time of the shooting was not of a general kind he was hired to perform, and was not 
motivated, even in part, by a desire to serve Delle Auto's business interests. 
The district court also properly ruled that, under the uncontroverted evidence, Stilinovich 
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding negligent employment. There was no 
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evidence that Delle Auto knew, or had reason to know, of any special circumstances which gave 
rise to a duty to take special precautions. 
ARGUMENT 
In the court below, Stilinovich asserted two theories of liability against Delle Auto: (1) 
respondeat superior, and (2) negligent supervision. As a matter of law, neither theory provides 
a basis for liability against Delle Auto in this case. 
I. COWDELL WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE 
SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF 
THE SHOOTING-
Standard of Review 
The district court's conclusion of law that Cowdell was not acting within the scope of 
employment is reviewed de novo by this Court. J.H. by D.H. v. West Valley City. 840 P.2d 
115 (Utah 1992). 
Argument 
The parties agree that, for an employee's conduct to be within the scope of employment, 
three elements must be present: 
First, an employee's conduct must be of the general kind the employee is 
employed to perform. . . . 
Second, the employee's conduct must occur within the hours of the employee's 
work and ordinary spacial boundaries of the employment. 
* * * 
Third, the employee's conduct must be motivated at least, in part, by the purpose 
of serving the employer's interest. . . . 
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Birkner v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989). While the question of 
whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment may ordinarily be a 
question of fact, some conduct is so clearly "outside the scope of employment that the issue may 
properly be decided by the trial judge as a matter of law." Id. at 1057. 
In this case, Delle Auto does not dispute that the accident occurred within the hours of 
Cowdell's work and ordinary spacial boundaries of his employment, which is the second element 
of the three-pronged test. However, the first and third elements are so clearly lacking that the 
district court properly ruled as a matter of law that Cowdell's alleged conduct was outside the 
scope of his employment. 
A. Cowdell's Conduct Was Not Of The General Kind He Was Employed To 
Perform. 
The first element required to be analyzed is whether the employee's conduct is of the 
general kind the employee was hired to perform. In Birkner. the Utah Supreme Court explained 
that this element "means that an employee's acts or conduct must be generally directed toward 
the accomplishment of objectives within the scope of the employee's duties and authority, or 
reasonably incidental thereto. In other words, the employee must be about the employer's 
business and the duties assigned by the employer, as opposed to being wholly involved in a 
personal endeavor." Id. (emphasis added). 
Unlike the third element, which focuses on an employee's state of mind, the first element 
requires objective examination of the circumstances. In this case, where the scope of Cowdell's 
assigned duties and the nature of the accident are undisputed, such analysis can and should be 
made as a matter of law. Cowdell's assigned duties were essentially to stock shelves, run the 
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cash register, and clean up. His duties expressly excluded anything relating to prevention of 
robberies, and particularly excluded the use of weapons to prevent a robbery. It is undisputed 
that Cowdell had been instructed not to try to prevent or resist any attempted crime; he was just 
"to let them have the money." 
In bringing a gun into the store, Cowdell was not "about his employer's business" or in 
any way performing "the duties assigned by" Delle Auto or incidental thereto. Moreover, even 
if bringing a gun into the store had been incidental, albeit contrary, to Cowdell's assigned duties, 
that characterization would not apply to his subsequent act of cleaning the gun. The gun had 
not been used at the truck stop and had not gotten dirty there. Cowdell knew that using a gun 
at work would be contrary to his employer's instructions. By no stretch of the imagination can 
cleaning one's own personal gun under these circumstances be considered "of a general kind the 
employee is employed to perform," or incidental thereto. 
In that respect, this case differs from Jefferson v. Rose Oil Co.. 232 So.2d 895 (La.App. 
1970), cited by Stilinovich. In that case, a gas station cashier shot a customer during a dispute 
over the customer's payment for gas which had already been pumped. Ensuring payment for 
gas was one of the attendant's duties. Although his efforts went awry, at the time of the 
shooting, the attendant was engaged in one of his assigned duties, and respondeat superior could 
appropriately lie. 
Stilinovich's reliance upon another Louisiana case, Howard v. Hardware Mutual Casualty 
Co.. 253 So.2d 555 (La.App. 1971), is similarly misplaced In discussing Howard. Stilinovich 
states that "the manager of a truck stop felt that it was his duty to maintain order." (Emphasis 
added). This characterization misstates the critical fact, emphasized by the Louisiana court, that 
10 
maintaining order was actually one of the manager's assigned duties: "Among his 
responsibilities, Mr. Mobley was supposed to keep order on the premises. . . . [T]he clear and 
uncontradicted testimony in the record given by Mr. and Mrs. Mobley [was] that he was 
responsible for keeping order on the premises. . . . " Id. at 556, 557. Thus, the court found 
the manager's act of shooting an aggressive customer to be "within the ambit of his assigned 
duties" as well as in furtherance of the employer's business. Id. 
Unlike the attendant in Jefferson and manager in Howard, Cowdell's actions in cleaning 
his gun on the premises were not even arguably within the "ambit" of, or reasonably incidental 
to, his assigned duties, as identified above. Again, it is undisputed that it was not an assigned 
duty to attempt to maintain order, especially during the course of a robbery. Requiring that an 
employee's conduct be, at a minimum, "of the general kind the employee is employed to 
perform" provides some protection for employers from liability for wholly unauthorized and 
unanticipated conduct by their employees. In Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance 
Co.. 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court was faced with application of the 
"going and coming" rule, under which employees are considered to be outside the scope of 
employment while on their way to and from work. In its analysis, the court noted that the major 
premise of the rule "is that it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for conduct 
of its employees over which it has no control and from which it derives no benefit." Id. at 937. 
Imposing liability upon an employer for conduct wholly outside of an employee's 
assigned duties -- those duties which the employer expects and plans for - would create 
unreasonable and unrealistic burdens upon employers. Under such a theory, an employer would 
have to engage in extensive training, background checks, etc., for each employee, regardless of 
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the position for which the employee was hired, just in case the employee unilaterally decided 
to take on unexpected additional duties. Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this Court has ever 
suggested that such an all-encompassing theory of liability is the law in Utah. 
Under Stilinovich's theory, bringing a weapon into a work place because of a perceived 
threat would be within the scope of every employee's duties. Any employee who works late 
hours, or in an isolated location, or is simply extra-sensitive, might perceive some risk to his 
or her personal safety. Such a perception cannot unilaterally enlarge the employee's assigned 
duties to include carrying a weapon, and should not subject that person's employer to liability 
if the employee accidentally injures someone with a gun. 
Furthermore, Stilinovich's Brief downplays the fact that at the time of the shooting 
Cowdell was not reacting to a perceived threat in any event. The customer had left, ;md 
Cowdell simply decided to clean his gun because it was dusty. To hold Delle Auto liable, 
Stilinovich would have to argue that the initial reason for bringing a gun in to work governs all 
future conduct with respect to that gun. If, after the suspicious character had left the store, 
Cowdell had deliberately pointed the gun at Stilinovich in fun or out of anger, Stilinovich 
presumably would not argue that such conduct was within the scope of Cowdell's assigned 
duties. The fact that the shooting occurred through an accident while cleaning the gun, rattier 
than horseplay or malice, does not change the fact that Cowdell's actions at that time had 
nothing to do with the original reason the gun was in the store, or with Cowdell's assigned 
duties. 
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B. Cowdell's Conduct Was Not Motivated By A Purpose Of Serving Delle Auto's 
Interest. 
The third element of the scope-of-employment test is that the employee's conduct must 
be motivated, at least in part, by a purpose of serving the employer's business interest. Birkner. 
supra, 111 P.2d at 1057. With respect to this element, the Utah Supreme Court has explained 
that f,[i]f the predominant motivation and purpose of the activity is in serving the social aspect, 
or other personal diversion of the employee, even though there may be some transaction of 
business or performance of duty thereto, the person should not be deemed to be in the course 
of his employment." Whitehead, supra, 801 P.2d at 937, quoting Martinson v. W-M Insurance 
Agency. Inc.. 606 P.2d 256, 258 (Utah 1980). One useful test, the Court noted, in an 
automobile-related case is "whether the trip is one which would have required the employer to 
send another employee over the same route or to perform the same function if the trip had not 
been made." Id. 
In this case, it is indisputable that Delle Auto would not have had another employee 
"perform the same function" if Cowdell had not brought his gun in, or had not cleaned his gun. 
In fact, if Delle Auto had learned Cowdell had a gun, he would have been ordered to remove 
it from the store. 
Moreover, Cowdell's own testimony established that his conduct was entirely motivated 
by personal reasons. Cowdell testified that his only reason for bringing the gun in to the store 
was for his own personal protection, and he had no intent of using it to protect Delle Auto's 
property or premises. (R.118 at 8) ("I wasn't thinking of Delle Auto Truck's safety, I was 
thinking about my own personal safety and Danny's, and I went out and got the gun."); (R. 118 
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at 26) ("Q. You made a comment earlier you weren't worried about that guy, as far as you 
didn't care if he stole the money or took some beer or whatever, but you were worried about 
your own safety. A. Yes."); (R.118 at 28) ("We thought he was going to rob the place. Still 
I wasn't concerned about robbing the place, I was concerned about us getting shot . . ."). 
Stilinovich apparently contends, however, that the "purpose" element is satisfied because 
an employee's interest in his own personal safety benefits the employer. That argument 
overlooks the fact that application of the third element hinges on the employee's motive, not the 
end result. The fact that an employee's purely personal action may have some benefit to an 
employer does not bring that conduct within the scope of employment any more than a lack of 
benefit would automatically insulate an employer from vicarious liability. 
Stilinovich's argument further overlooks the fact that mere incidental benefit to an 
employer is insufficient to place conduct within the scope of employment. Innumerable types 
of conduct may be assumed to benefit an employer. Nonetheless, such conduct is not within the 
scope of employment if it fails to meet one or more of the required elements. Cf. Christensen 
v. Burns International Security Services. 844 P.2d 992 (Utah App. 1992) (fact that employee 
was returning from nearby restaurant frequented by defendant's employees, employee did not 
have regular lunch break but was expected to get lunch during breaks in traffic at station, and 
company knew of and presumably benefitted from employee's patronage of nearby restaurant 
were immaterial where accident failed to satisfy second element); Whitehead, supra, (benefit 
received from employee bringing personal vehicle to work did not warrant finding of scope of 
employment); Lane v. Messer. 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986) (fact that employer for its own benefit 
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required employees to take service vehicles home with them and knew vehicles were driven for 
personal use did not render employer liable for accident involving vehicle). 
Finally, Stilinovich's argument fails to recognize that, whatever the employee's initial 
purpose for having the gun, his subsequent cleaning of the gun was distinct from that purpose. 
The same conclusion was reached by the Texas Court of Appeals in a case involving similar 
facts. In Hein v. Harris County. 557 S.W.2d 366 (Tex.Civ.App. - Houston, 1977), writ 
refused, no reversible error, the plaintiff was employed in the defendant county's sign shop. 
Part of his duties included repairing and installing traffic signs. On the day of the accident, the 
plaintiff and another county employee, Carlton, were installing signs in a rural area of the 
county. The court's opinion sets forth the events leading to an accidental shooting of the 
plaintiff: 
On the day prior to the accident, plaintiff and Carlton had encountered numerous 
snakes in the area. Carlton obtained a pistol and took it to the job site the day 
of the accident. During the morning's work Carlton shot and killed several 
snakes. After they had finished their work, they went to a house in the area 
which belonged to a friend of Carlton's for the purpose of calling back to the 
camp to receive further instructions as was customary. 
After calling the camp they discussed snakes they had killed with Carlton's 
friend. As they were preparing to leave to return to camp, the plaintiff went to 
the back of the pickup truck to straighten out some tools. Carlton went to the 
truck and obtained the pistol to show it to his friend. While he was attempting 
to remove the clip, he banged the gun on the palm of his hand several times. The 
pistol accidentally discharged and the bullet struck the plaintiff in the right 
temple, penetrating completely through the eye socket and destroying the eyeball. 
Id. at 367. 
To resolve an issue regarding governmental immunity, the court was first required to 
determine whether the shooting had occurred within the scope of employment. The court found 
that it had not: 
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The evidence establishes that Carlton's negligent conduct occurred at a time when 
he was merely showing the pistol to a friend. He had completed the business 
which brought him to his friend's house and had delayed his departure for that 
purpose. The rule is that when a servant turns aside, no matter how short the 
time, from the prosecution of the master's work to engage in an affair wholly his 
own, he ceases to act for the master, and the responsibility for his actions in 
pursuing his own business or pleasure is upon him alone. The action of Carlton 
in attempting to remove the clip from the pistol for the purpose of showing it to 
a friend was something wholly disconnected from his employment and not for the 
benefit of his employer. 
Id. at 368 (citation omitted; emphasis added).1 
Similarly, Cowdell's conduct in cleaning the gun, which was Cowdell's personal property 
and needed cleaned only because of Cowdell's prior personal use of it, was "wholly disconnected 
from his employment and not for the benefit of his employer." 
In an analogous case, Olson v. Staggs-Bilt Homes, Inc., 23 Ariz.App. 574, 534 P,2d 
1073 (1975), review denied, the defendant's agent, Greer, hired Urban to patrol subdivisions 
under construction by the defendant. The employee "was instructed to observe and report 
suspicious activities to the police or to Greer, but was not to become involved." Id., 534 P 2d 
at 1074. On the day in question, 
Urban picked up a Staggs truck and proceeded to a service station to fill the truck 
with gas before starting his patrol. There is no dispute that this occurred within 
the time frame of Urban's employment. While at the gas station, Urban, for 
some reason, pulled his gun from the holster and Olson was shot. The testimony 
diverges sharply regarding whether the gun was pulled for Olson's inspection or 
whether it was displayed in horseplay; in either case it is clear that the shooting 
was accidental. 
Other circumstances noted by the court in Olson echo the allegations in this case: 
1
 The court did not address whether the initial act of bringing the gun was within the scope 
of employment. 
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A second dispute arises regarding Urban's authority to carry a pistol. It is 
conceded by both parties that Urban was given permission and even provided a 
gun on one particular evening (not the evening involved here). Staggs-Bilt, by 
the affidavit of Greer, states that aside from that one evening no permission was 
given nor was a weapon provided. In fact, it is claimed that Urban was explicitly 
commanded not to carry a weapon. Urban maintains that he was never instructed 
not to carry a gun; that the gun he was provided for the one particular night was 
left under the seat of the truck for him for several weeks thereafter; and, that he 
thinks Greer had seen him with the gun strapped on his hip and had never 
commented. 
/d.,534P.2dat 1074-75. 
The appellate court upheld summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiffs 
respondeat superior theory. The court analyzed the scope-of-employment issue under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 228, which sets forth a three-pronged test virtually identical to 
that adopted in Utah: 
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: 
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; 
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; 
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master . . . 
As in this case, the parties agreed that the incident happened during authorized time and 
space parameters, the second of the three elements. However, the appellate court agreed with 
the defendant that the first and third elements were missing. The court found immaterial the 
parties' dispute as to how the accident occurred and the circumstances of the employee carrying 
a gun, because either version "does not show the conduct to be of a kind authorized. Nor was 
the activity precedent to the injury actuated in part by any desire to serve the master." Id., 534 
P.2d at 1075. 
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In an effort to avoid this conclusion, Stilinovich cites American Oil Company v. 
McClusky. 167 S.E.2d 711 (Ga.App. 1969). In that case, the court found that an employee 
carried a gun for the dual purpose of defending himself and protecting the property of his 
employer. McClusky is inapplicable to the facts of this case, however. First, the Utah Supreme 
Court has rejected the type of "dual purpose" analysis utilized in McClusky. See Whitehead. 
supra, 801 P.2d at 937 ("We have taken a different view of this exception. . . . If the 
predominant motivation and purpose of the activity is in serving the social aspect, or other 
personal diversion of the employee, even though there may be some transaction of business or 
performance of duty merely incidental or adjunctive thereto, the person should not be deemed 
to be in the course of his employment.") 
Furthermore, the undisputed evidence is that Cowdell brought the gun in to the store for 
only one purpose, that of his own protection. Cowdell expressly testified that he had no 
intention of using the gun to protect any of Delle Auto's property or other interests. 
Summary 
The district court correctly ruled as a matter of law that Cowdell's conduct did not occur 
within the scope and course of his employment with Delle Auto. Cowdell's actions were not 
"of a general kind" he was hired to perform, and were entirely or predominantly motivated by 
personal concerns. Consequently, the summary judgment should be affirmed. 
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H. STILINOVICH FAILED TO RAISE AN ISSUE OF 
FACT REGARDING NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION 
AND TRAINING OF COWDELL. 
Standard of Review 
The district court's conclusion that Stilinovich did not raise a genuine issue of fact 
regarding negligent supervision is reviewed de novo by this Court. J.H. by D.H. v. West 
Valley City. 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992). 
Argument 
For his second cause of action, Stilinovich alleged that Delle Auto was "negligent in 
failing to properly supervise and train Quade Cowdell . . . ." (R.2). The Utah Supreme Court 
has recognized that, even if an employee's conduct is outside the scope of employment, an 
employer may still be liable for negligent hiring or supervision. See, Clover v. Snowbird Ski 
Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Utah 1991); Birkner. supra, 111 P.2d at 1059. 
The standard to be applied in such cases was set forth by a majority of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Lane, supra, 731 P.2d at 491-92 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).2 The three-justice 
concurrence in Lane indicated that a claim of negligent supervision is properly analyzed under 
Sections 315 and 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. As set forth in Section 315, "[t]here 
is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical 
harm to another unless . . . a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which 
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct." Lane, supra, 731 P.2d 
at 492 (original omissions). 
2
 Justices Durham and Hall concurred in Justice Zimmerman's opinion. 
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Applying that section and Section 317 of the Restatement, the concurring justices noted: 
In some cases, a special relationship may exist between an employer and an 
employee that will give rise to such a duty to control even when the employee is 
acting outside the scope of employment. However, because the employee is 
acting outside the scope of employment, the exposure to liability created by 
section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, unlike the liability imposed on 
the employer by the doctrine of respondeat superior, does not arise simply 
because the employment relationship exists; it is imposed only when special 
circumstances exist and are known to the employer. For example, an employer 
must exercise reasonable care to control an employee acting outside the scope of 
employment to prevent that employee from creating an "unreasonable risk of 
harm to others" if the employee is using an employer's chattel and the employer 
"knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising control." 
Id. (citations omitted). 
In Lane, the issue was whether Honeywell could be liable for a drunk driving accident 
involving a company service van. The evidence showed that Honeywell, for its benefit, required 
employees to take company service vehicles home with them. Although Honeywell had a 
written policy prohibiting personal use of the vehicles, the policy was widely disregarded, and 
it was generally understood that personal use was permissible if not excessive. In fact, the 
Honeywell employee, Messer, did not have a car of his own, and his supervisor was aware that 
Messer used the Honeywell van for personal use. In spite of this knowledge, "Honeywell 
conducted no investigation into the driving records of employees who were assigned vans. 
Company policy required the drivers of company vehicles to have class A chauffeur's licenses. 
Messer had only a valid Utah operator's license." Id. at 490. 
The three concurring justices concluded that the plaintiff could not establish a claim for 
negligent supervision under the Restatement test: 
[U]nder Section 317 of the Restatement, Honeywell was only obligated to take 
reasonable steps to prevent Messer from creating an unreasonable risk of bodily 
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harm to others resulting from his use of the company's van //Honeywell knew 
or had reason to know that such steps were necessary. 
* * * 
To satisfy Section 317, the jury would have to find that Honeywell knew or had 
reason to know that Messer would drive the van while intoxicated, thus creating 
an unreasonable risk to others. 
Id. (original emphasis). 
The evidence in that case, viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, did not raise an issue 
of fact for the jury. Id. The district court properly reached the same conclusion in this case. 
Stilinovich offered no evidence suggesting that Delle Auto knew or should have known that 
Cowdell would bring a gun to work and carelessly shoot his friend. In fact, the undisputed 
evidence tended to prove the opposite: Although Cowdell did not recall being told by Morris 
not to have a weapon at work, he testified that he was instructed not to offer any resistance to 
a criminal act, and neither Morris nor his co-workers knew that he had a gun. Although 
Cowdell had been working at Delle Auto for only a few months, there had been no incidents or 
problems which could have alerted Delle Auto to a risk of his ultimate conduct. Furthermore, 
Cowdell's duties as a clerk did not pose an inherent unreasonable risk of harm to others. On 
this point, Section 213 Restatement (Second) of Agency, comment d, states: 
One who employs another to act for him is not liable under rules stated in this 
section merely because the one employed is incompetent, vicious, or careless. 
If liability results it is because, under the circumstances, the employer has not 
taken the care which a prudent man would take in selecting the person for the 
business in hand. What precautions must be taken depends upon the situation. 
One can normally assume that another who offers to perform simple work is 
competent. If, however, the work is likely to subject third persons to serious 
risks of great harm, there is a special duty of investigation. 
Liability results under the rule stated in this section, not because of the 
relationship of the parties, but because the employer antecedently had reason to 
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believe that an undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment. The 
employer is subject to liability only for such harm as is within the risk. If, 
therefore, the risk exists because of the quality of the employee, there is liability 
only to the extent that the harm is caused by the quality of the employee which 
the employer had reason to suppose would be likely to cause harm. 
(Emphasis added). 
Courts have recognized the validity of this proposition under analogous circumstances. 
In Kassman v. Busfield Enterprises. Inc.. 131 Ariz. 163, 639 P.2d 353 (App. 1981), review 
denied, defendant Whitaker was a doorman at a bar. He was not authorized to carry a firearm 
or any other weapon while carrying out his duties as a doorman, and had been instructed to 
contact a security guard if difficulties arose. On the night in question, an over-enthusiastic 
bouncer attempting to break up a fight yelled to the doorman "Armed robbery. Get the police." 
The doorman, armed with his own personal gun, chased the participants into a parking lot and 
shot one of them. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed judgment in favor of the employer on a negligent 
employment theory. The court noted that "[a]ny weapons that Whitaker carried during his 
employment were for his own protection on the job, according to his testimony." Id. at 357. 
The court further recognized that "[w]hat precautions must be taken depend upon the situation. 
One can normally assume that another who offers to perform simple work is competent." Id., 
quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213, comment d. 
Thus, the court found no duty to investigate the doorman's prior criminal background 
before hiring him. "[W]hitaker was not authorized to carry a firearm or any other type of 
weapon while carrying out his duties as doorman. As in Olson where the employee's work was 
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relatively simple and no special training was required, Wliitaker's job as doorman likewise was 
relati -
The Olson court had also affirmed summary judemeni or_ a plaintiffs negligent 
e • • ; • ..n was a nineteen year old man hiicu tu pairol 
two subdivisions l' something was awry he was not to become involved but rather was to 
contact the authorities . • evidence that Urban was known to be vicious or careless 
when hired by Staggs-Bilt. No special 1131111111" >" 1 mvrssan In 11li' ' llilun 1 ru'iuli INS 
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the store clean, and operating the cash register. Cowdell, at 16 years of a^e 
^ ettectively perform the duties for which he was hired.3 In fact, Utah law provides that 
"[m]inors 14 years oi a 
Cowdell was married and living on his own at the time, 
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including: . . . automobile service stations, except for the operation of motor vehicles and the 
use of hoists." Utah Code Ann. § 34-23-204(b) (emphasis added).4 
In addition to adducing proof of deficiency in Cowdell as an employee, Stilinovich was 
also "required to show that [Cowdell's] acts were foreseeable. There is no duty to protect 
persons from unforeseeable risks of harm at the hands of another." J.H.. supra, at 126. 
Stilinovich has not alleged or shown that Cowdell's conduct of bringing the gun into the store, 
or his later act of cleaning the gun while at work, was foreseeable. In light of Cowdell's duties, 
and in light of the uncontroverted testimony that neither Morris nor any other employee was 
aware of Cowdell's gun, there is no evidence that Delle Auto had reason to know that Cowdell 
might accidentally shoot his friend while at work. 
Finally, to impose liability for negligent supervision, a plaintiff must prove causation. 
In this case, there is insufficient evidence to raise a fact issue on that element. Suggesting that 
additional supervision would have prevented Cowdell's conduct is pure speculation; in fact, the 
uncontroverted evidence suggests otherwise. Cowdell had completed a gun safety course and 
presumably knew better than to point a gun in someone's direction. Cowdell also acknowledged 
that he knew his conduct was contrary to Delle Auto's instructions. "Therefore, it is not 
4
 Stilinovich also contends that defendant Delle Auto was in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 32A-10-102(4), which provides that a minor may not sell beer on the premises of a beer 
retailer for off-premises consumption except under the supervision of someone 21 years of age 
or older who is on the premises. Even assuming for the sake of this argument that Delle Auto 
was in violation of §32A-10-102(4), such violation is irrelevant to the present case. Stilinovich 
has not shown he was a member of the class of person for whom the statute was designed to 
protect, Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp.. 774 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1989) (violation of 
OSHA regulation may constitute negligence only if claimant is member of class for whom statute 
designed to protect); see also, Figone v. Guisti. 185 P. 694 (Cal. App. 1919) (statute prohibiting 
employment of minor in saloon was for protection of minor, not customer shot by employee). 
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reasonable to assume that additional rules would have had any effect on him," J.H.. supru, 
P.2dat i?li« 
Stilinovich failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligent 
si jporu IIIIIII IIII I ill In nil! mil |iiii|nii| giantcd summary judgment on the claim. 
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I jregoing reasons, Dene Auto Truck Stops respectfully requests the Court to 
affirm the summary judgment. 
DATED this / / day of September, 1993. 
I ' H K I S n N S I ' N , JhNJSLN \ I'OWI I I I' I 
William J. H a n s e l 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Delle Auto Truck Stop, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the / / day of September, 1993, two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to: 
R. Phil Ivie 
Jeffery C. Peatross 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
William J. Hans 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Delle Auto Truck Stop, Inc. 
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5. There had been no complaints by customers of Delle 
Auto Truck Stop that the employee had ever mentioned, displayed, or 
brandished a gun, or made any threats whatsoever with a gun so as 
to alert the employer of a problem. 
6. The employer was not aware of any bizarre behavior 
by the employee. 
7. There is no evidence that the employee ever dressed 
in any kind of abnormal attire, such as "Rambo" type attire, which 
may alert the employer of a potential problem. 
8. There is no indication that the employee ever made 
any bizarre or unusual statements which would alert Delle Auto 
Truck Stop of any potential problem. 
9. Any perceived danger which prompted the employee to 
obtain a gun from his vehicle as a result of a suspicious character 
coming into the Truck Stop had clearly abated or defused before the 
employee commenced cleaning the gun. 
10. Cleaning the gun was not part of the employee7s job 
description. 
11. Delle Auto did not encourage, invite, or expect the 
employee to have a gun at work. 
12. Delle Auto did not encourage, invite, or expect the 
employee to clean the gun on the premises. 
13. It was not part of the employee's job description to 
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3. It was not foreseeable that the employee would bring 
a weapon to work and shoot the plaintiff. 
4. The possession of a gun at work by Mr* Cowdell was 
not directed towards accomplishing objectives of his employer. 
5. The possession of a gun at work was not reasonably 
incidental to the benefit of Delle Auto Truck Stop. 
6. The conduct of Mr. Cowdell was not motivated, even 
in part, by the purpose of serving his employer's interests. 
7. The possession of a gun at work by Mr. Cowdell was 
for purely personal reasons. 
8. The alleged violation of statutes by plaintiff was 
not causally connected to the accident involving Mr. Stilinovich. 
9. The employee's conduct was not generally the kind 
the employee was employed to perform. 
10. Delle Auto Truck Stop is not vicariously liable for 
the act of the employee in shooting the plaintiff. 
DATED this £<X day of //^ /7yfc. £/L 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
By: ^ ^ f? U/ / S^r^ / ^-^ 
PAT B. BRIAN, " D i s t r i c t Jildge 
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William J. Hansen, #1353 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL PATRICK STILINOVICH, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
DELLE AUTO TRUCK STOP, INC. ] 
Defendant. ; 
i ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No: 920300055 
i Judge: Pat B. Brian 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Delle Auto 
Truck Stop, Inc. came on for hearing on February 8, 1993, pursuant 
to notice before the Honorable Pat B. Brian. William J. Hansen 
appeared on behalf of defendant Delle Auto Truck Stop. Jeffery C. 
Peatross appeared on behalf of plaintiff. 
The Court considered the submitted written memoranda, the 
respective oral argument of the parties and being fully advised in 
the premises, and good cause appearing; 
HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED as follows: 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Delle Auto 
Truck Stop, Inc. is granted and plaintiff's claims against 
defendant are dismissed with prejudice. The basis for this ruling 
oooioa 
jj :s set _*_* ... .,. the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered 
by the Court, 
DATED , / / /., h_ A, u 
BY THE COURT; 
• ^ > ^ ^ - * - , ^ 
PAT B. BRIAN, ui >*—«—Fnif-H- .Ti,^ «0 
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1993, to: 
Jeffery C. Peatross, Esq. 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
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